This paper sheds new light on the role of borrower characteristics in mortgage product choice, and how these are impacted by regulatory capital requirements.Using rich loan-level data from the Australian market we analyse the way in which these risk effects impact the choice between adjustable rate mortgages and a range of complex mortgages which provide reduced initial payments. For the first time we find that all three of income, wealth and mobility risks play a role in product choice. We also investigate the role of regulatory capital requirements in an environment where banks hold mortgage risk on their balance sheet and find that the Basel capital discounts based on loan-to-valuation ratios divide otherwise similar borrowers between ARM and CM product choices.
Introduction
The structure of mortgage markets varies substantially around the globe; Warnock and Warnock (2008), Scanlon et al (2008) , Badarinza et al (2013) . The benchmark US market is dominated by securitized long term fixed rate mortgages, while the prevalence of adjustable rate and short-term fixed rate products is generally higher in other countries; Lea (2010a,b) . Currently, considerable attention is focused on the diversity of mortgage product choices, in part due to the importance of the US mortgage market in precipitating the global financial crisis, but also reflecting the key role that mortgages play in monetary policy transmission; Calza et al (2013) and Landier et al (2013) . Mortgage product choice is additionally relevant in assessing market completeness and risk management, and hence has strong implications for optimal householder outcomes; Campbell and Cocco (2003) , Miles (2005) .
Unlike much of the existing literature, this paper considers mortgage choice in an economy where mortgage transactions are not influenced by institutional structures such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the US, government mortgage insurance (in the US, Netherlands and Canada) or government security guarantees (in US, Canada and Japan); see Campbell (2013) , Lea (2010b) , Green and Wachter (2005) , and Frame and White (2005) . Outside the US the structure of the mortgage market can be quite different. For example, in Australia securitization plays a minimal role in sourcing funds for banks, there is strong prudential regulation, but no public mortgage insurance scheme and no government deposit guarantee existed prior to the global financial crisis of 2008-09.
New products, which lie between the usually investigated adjustable rate mortgages (ARM) and fixed rate mortgages (FRM) are more common in markets like Australia than in the US benchmark. Recent work has begun to reflect interest in the popularity of these alternative mortgage products (AMPs) or complex mortgages (CMs). Amromin et al (2011) introduced the CM terminology to denote the increasing array of mortgage products ranging between ARMs and FRMs. They define CMs as products categorized by low introductory 'teaser' interest rates, short interest rate reset periods and deferred principal repayment. AMPs can be distinguished from CMs in that they mainly represent contracts with zero or neg- The paper has two main contributions. First, we empirically investigate household mortgage choice between CM and ARM products with the inclusion of a full range of mortgage cost variables, market conditions and borrower characteristics in the absence of the institutional structures previously mentioned.
1 Second, we find important differences in some of the mortgage choice effects when we control for the level of loan-to-value (LTV) ratio imposed by the Basel capital requirements, revealing the relationship between these prudential regulatory structures and the choices of individual households. Using a unique dataset from over half a million mortgage applications by owner-occupiers in Australia between [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] we establish the dominance of mortgage cost in determining the product chosen, consistent with the existing literature for other markets. However, we shed new light on the role of borrower characteristics due to the rich detail in our complete individual, bank-verified loan application data -unlike existing studies we do not rely on interpolated or survey based measures.
Borrower characteristics can be expected to play a role in mortgage product choice because they are indicators of borrowers exposure to, and attitudes towards, various kinds of risks. Theoretically, borrower characteristics relate directly to income risk, wealth risk, mobility risk and borrowing constraints as in Campbell and Cocco (2003) . Theory predicts that consumers facing income risks will prefer to take a product which reduces the variability of their payments. Tests of this proposition have been attempted in the literature using a variety of proxies with little success in obtaining significant relationships. 2 The potential for future income growth, reducing the importance of mortgage payments in the household 1 Amromin et al (2011) examine choice between ARM, CM and FRM in the US but have only income and geographical proxies available for borrower characteristics. Sa-Aadu and Sirmans (1995) investigate a range of different mortgage options which are distinguished only by frequency of interest rate adjustment and term.
2 Proxies for income risk used have been the presence of children, non-durable expenditure, age, income levels and growth, education, occupation, self-employment or public employee, and income volatility estimated using a Mincer equation -see Brueckner and Follain (1988) , Dhillon et al (1987) , Sa-Aadu and Sirmans (1995), Paiella and Pozzolo (2007) , Coulibaly and Li (2009) , Cocco (2013) .
are shown to fill a niche of facilitating housing purchase for wealth constrained and consumers averse to income risk.
Finally, we find that the prudential capital requirements associated with onbalance-sheet mortgages interact with borrower characteristics to influence mortgage product choice. Fully documented mortgage loans with loan-to-value ratio (LTV) of up to 80 percent or low document loans with LTV of up to 60 percent attract a 50 percent capital weighting under Basel II rules. An LTV of over 80 percent requires purchase of loan insurance by the borrower (this product pays out to the lender, so acts as an additional cost to the borrower). Low doc loans with LTV of greater than 60 percent weighting attract no discount to capital requirements. Australian loans cluster around LTV of 60 and 80 percent consistent with these institutional requirements. The role of borrower characteristics is influenced by LTV; we show that some constrained borrowers show a greater preference for CM products when faced with high LTV, while others choose a greater propensity to hold both default and interest rate risk, particularly those with higher discretionary expenditure to reallocate, and those with expectations of higher income and wealth. Although borrowers are probably unaware of these effects, capital requirements for lenders influence mortgage choice via their interaction with borrower characteristics. In this sense, this paper emphasizes the fact that the chosen products reflect the intersection of supply-side effects with borrower characteristics, an aspect not included in the framework of Campbell and Cocco (2003) and Miles (2004) who do not model bank behaviour.
Section 2 provides some background on the Australian mortgage market. The empirical methodology is given in Section 3, and Section 4 presents the data set.
The results are discussed in Section 5 and the specific issues surrounding the effects of LTV ratios in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
Background
The Australian banking industry is highly concentrated, with the four largest banks having more than 60 percent of owner-occupied loan approvals. Smaller banks have around 20 percent market share, credit unions and building societies less than 10 percent, and wholesale mortgage originators less than 10 percent; Davies (2009) . The share of total housing credit funded by securitization rose from 10 percent in 2000 to more than 20 percent in 2007, at which point issuance of residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) fell sharply with the onset of the global financial crisis. Almost all this increase reflected the use of securitization as a funding vehicle for mortgage originators, credit unions and smaller banks to access competitive funding; Debelle (2008 Debelle ( , 2009 . Major banks fund their mortgage debt predominantly through deposits and long-and short-term wholesale debt.
Australian mortgages are predominantly an ARM product -a credit foncier loan written for terms of up to 30 years, with the interest rate adjustable periodically at the discretion of the bank. A FRM such as commonly described in the international literature with a rate fixed for a very long term is not available; instead a loan with an interest rate fixed for an initial period (usually between 3 to 5 years) is offered, after which terms are renegotiated. Under renegotiation the options include conversion to an ARM or to a second FRM. In this paper we denote this product as a short FRM or SFRM. Full cost recovery fees apply to customers wishing to exit SFRM contracts prior to the expiration of the fixed rate period if market interest rates fall below the agreed rate.
The SFRM is one example of the growing category of CM products. An increasing market share in many economies has been captured by products which reduce the initial payment burden for the consumer, but retain the longer term mortgage risks with the consumer, not with the financial institution. Such products include honeymoon or teaser mortgages (HM), which offer a discounted introductory interest rate, contracts with periodically reset fixed interest rates, and equity withdrawal mortgages. More recently CMs have extended to include reverse mortgages, interest-only loans, shared-equity loans, low-doc loans for borrowers who self-report their financial position and forms of non-conforming loans for borrowers not meeting standard lending criteria. However, Debelle (2010) , reported that low-doc loans never comprised more than 10 percent of housing loan approvals in Australia, and non-conforming loans never exceeded 2 percent of the total in data up to 2009. As in many countries, taxation incentives exist in the housing market. The consumption services provided by owner-occupied homes are not taxable, and neither are capital gains on the sale of these properties. While mortgage interest 6 payable by owner-occupiers is not tax deductible, 7 owners of dwellings purchased for investment purposes receive a deduction against wage and salary income for all associated expenses. Tax losses made in this way are not capped. Loans for owner-occupied housing comprise two thirds of banks' outstanding housing loans, and this proportion has shown very little variation in the last decade which includes our sample period. To further encourage home ownership, and in partial compensation for the introduction of the goods and service tax in 2000, there is a variety of grants and tax concessions offered to owner-occupiers by all levels of government to first home buyers, see Dungey et al (2011). 
Empirical Specification
We consider the following index model.
where at time of application, household i makes a decision to choose the mortgage product, y * i which best matches its risk profile given mortgage costs, the economic and credit market conditions prevailing, and household characteristics. However, there is not a continuum of mortgage products available, so that the observed behavior is the choice of either an ARM or CM product. Consequently, 7 Bourassa (1995) argues that the user cost of owner-occupied housing has a significant impact on tenure choice. In particular, he points out that the housing user cost depends on the loan-tovalue ratio (LTV) because mortgage interest is not deductible in Australia.
8 Outside of our sample period short-term variation in these concessions has also been used as an instrument of macroeconomic stabilization during the 2008-2009 global financial crisis. We are then interested in the probability of choosing an ARM which can be expressed as a Probit:
where Φ(.) is the cumulative distribution of the standard normal ε i .
Our maintained hypothesis is that choice of mortgage type is independent of the decision to apply for a mortgage. This assumption is dictated by our data which refer to mortgage applications. Longitudinal surveys such as the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey offer the potential to examine this issues, but questions on the type of mortgage were first asked in Wave 10 of the survey, conducted in late 2010, which is after the global financial crisis, and outside our sample period. 
RAT E
where The predicted interest rate differential is then formed as the difference between the fitted values, where two interest rate spreads are built based on the two CM products
Our choice of terms recognises the convention from the existing literature by denoting the spread between the SFRM and ARM as 'RATEDIFF' and the difference between the ARM and HM as the 'Discount'. The second stage estimates equation (2) inserting the newly built fitted interest rate differentials (RATEDIFF and
It is possible, however, that in equations (3) and (4), E(u lowest interest rate, or because the decision on the type of mortgage product offered and the interest rate charged is simultaneous (possibly together with loan amount, loan term and loan-to-value ratio), or because of other factors not captured in the model. Therefore, we estimate the two-stage procedure following Brueckner and Follain (1988) and Lee and Trost (1978) to correct for selectivity bias using inverse Mills ratios.
The estimation results are presented in Table 2 . The first column of Table  2 
Loan-level Data
The underlying data in this study refer to bank-originated mortgages issued to applicants for owner-occupied housing, including applications for the refinancing of Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix, while Table 1 although estimation proceeds including the full set of variables. Exact definitions of all variables are given in the Appendix.
The mortgage costs variables, shown in Table 3 , include the monthly ARM interest rate, the interest differential between SFRM and ARM mortgages, and the discount on the HM discussed above, bank fees, a dummy to represent large loans (over $500,000), the loan-to-value ratio (LTV) and the payment-to-income ratio (PTIR). We also include an interaction variable between the interest rate differential and the borrower's income.
Market conditions variables are also shown in Table 3 . These include unemployment, inflation and housing inflation rates, the net assistance provided by Federal and State governments to first home buyers obtained from Dungey et al (2011) . Consumer sentiment on housing market conditions is captured through changes in the dwelling index collected by Westpac-Melbourne Institute. To control for competition between lenders, given that we only have one bank provider, we include a dummy indicating whether the Bank was offering the lowest market interest rate for SFRM at time of application.
The borrower characteristics in our data set are particularly rich; see Tables   4-5 . One group of variables concerns household structure and demographics and includes borrower age, gender, marital status, number of dependent children, and the presence of very young children. Loan servicing capacity is captured by income, expenditure, occupation and employment status, with additional information on their financial position provided by variables on net wealth, liquid assets and short term liabilities. Evidence of any ongoing relationship with the bank is captured by the number of years as a client and the number of current accounts and credit facilities. As a proxy for mobility we use a binary dummy to indicate whether the applicant will change post-code (suburb) from their address at time of mortgage application and the address of the new property.
Empirical Results
The baseline applicant is a 40-year-old single salary-earning male without a co-applicant, with no dependents, who is not a first-time homebuyer, with a loan under $500,000. Tables 3 to 5 present the average marginal effects of the probit estimation.
Column (1) presents results where the interest rate differential variables are the simple monthly averages of the interest rates reported by the bank. It is apparent that the spread between the SFRM and ARM (RATEDIFF) has a negative and significant coefficient, suggesting a preference for ARMs as they become relatively more expensive in the short term. This is clearly at odds with the existing literature. However, column (2) reports the results using interest rate differentials (RATEDIFF and Discount) built from the fitted rates from equations (3)- (4) and selectivity bias correction, which reverses this abnormal finding. For this reason, we concentrate our analysis on the results in column (2), but note that the marginal effects for most other variables are relatively unaffected by this change.
We proceed in the following sections to discuss the effect of mortgage cost variables and market conditions and separately, borrower characteristics. We emphasise that all estimations were conducted including all categories of variables simultaneously. Additionally, to test the relevance of the three different categories, we report specifications which include only mortgage cost variables, in column (3) of the tables, and only borrower characteristics in column (4) of the tables. (A specification including only market conditions has no explanatory power and is not reported separately.) It is apparent from these last two columns that each of these sets of variables plays a role -and that together they enrich the modeling specification. The pseudo − R 2 statistics reported at the bottom of Table 5 , show the contribution of each group of variables is non-negligible. Thus, one would not wish to exclude borrower characteristics from empirical specifications of mortgage product choice.
Mortgage Cost and Market Condition Variables
In line with the existing literature, the results in Table 3 support the importance of the interest rate in mortgage choice. Here, a 100 basis point increase in the ARM interest rate decreases the probability of taking an ARM by 9.3 percent. For example, the predicted probability of taking an ARM when the prevailing ARM rate is 6.9 percent (as in June 2005) is 61 percent; while when the prevailing rate is 9 percent (as in August 2008) the predicted probability is 41 percent.
A widening range between the SFRM and the ARM (RATEDIFF) is expected 13 to increase the probability of ARM choice as this becomes the relatively cheaper product. This is reflected in our results, where an increase in the margin of the SFRM over the ARM of 100 basis points leads to a 52.9 percent increase in the probability of the household choosing an ARM product. Clearly households are very sensitive to relative interest rates in choosing their financing product. However, when we control for a potential non-linearity in the spread between SFRM and ARM related to income (RATEDIFF × Income), our results suggest that borrowers with higher income are a little less sensitive to a widening spread between the rates of these two contracts. The discount offered on a HM contract (Discount)
is less important in magnitude, however it is statistically significant and has the expected sign. For a 100 basis point rise in the discount between an ARM and a HM there is a 4.1 percent fall in the probability of observing an ARM product choice.
Mortgage applicants are also sensitive to higher bank fees; higher bank fees are associated with greater probability of ARM choice. To contextualise this result, an increase of $100 over the observed average bank fee of $630 would result in the predicted probability of ARM to only rise from 57 percent to 60 percent. However, if the fee increases by $1,000, the probability of observing an ARM increases from 57 percent to 86.5 percent. Loans of greater than $500,000 attract a further marginal increased probability of selecting an ARM of about 20 percent. To put this in Australian context, it is useful to know that the median (2006) house price in Sydney was $470,000.
13
Loan servicing ratios also affect mortgage choice. As repayment risk increases through higher loan-to-value ratios (LTV) and higher payment-to-income ratios (PTIR), households are less likely to choose an ARM over a CM. A LTV ratio below 80 percent attracts a 50 percent discount on Basel capital requirements on lenders. At very high LTV, say 100 percent, the probability of observing an ARM is 51 percent, but at 80 percent LTV the probability of observing an ARM is 55 percent. We return to the issue of LTVs in Section 6. Borrowers' response to potential home equity gains is strongly reflected in the increased probability of observing an ARM as consumer sentiment around a dwelling purchase derived from the Westpac-Melbourne Institute survey improves.
An increase in this buying sentiment index increases the probability of taking an ARM by 21 percent; the incentive provided by potential capital gains may outweigh the savings from delayed repayments in a CM. This result dominates the effect of observed house price inflation.
Over the sample period the Australian government has provided a number of programs to boost home ownership for first home buyers (FHBs). Using the measure of net assistance from Dungey et al (2011) we find that increased support to FHBs leads to a small decrease in the probability of these borrowers taking an ARM in favour of a CM. This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that this scheme attracts applicants with low deposits into the market.
Given that our data are provided by one major bank, albeit with national representation, we also control for whether this bank is offering the lowest SFRM interest rate in the market on the month of application. When the bank is offering the lowest interest rate on a SFRM contract relative to the other banks, borrowers are more likely to take a CM contract (we contend this is most likely a SFRM).
Our study excludes a number of interest rate control variables included in previous literature; in particular the spread between the long-term government 15 bond rate and short-term bill rate, and the central bank official target rate.
14 The ARM rate is closely related to the official short rate and the SFRM rate closely follows the market rate on the 3-year Australian Government bond. 15 As these rates have been used to construct the yield curve in Table 8 , they are omitted from the probit specification.
Borrower Characteristics and Risk Categories
In our uniquely detailed and bank-verified data, we can identify significant effects of most borrower characteristics, which when classified into income, wealth and mobility risk groupings, provide evidence consistent with the existing theo-
16 Tables 4 and 5 Income risk is captured by 7 variables: real gross income level, the unemployment rate, self-employment status, marriage, presence of a co-borrower, occupational categories and age. The marginal effects of income, marriage, co-borrower and occupational category are individually quite small, as reported in column (2) of Table 4 . The uncertainty associated with higher unemployment provides the largest effect -a 6.4 percent decrease in the probability of an ARM associated 14 15 We thank market participants and regulators for feedback on this point. 16 Dhillon et al (1987) find some evidence of the negative effect of marital status and presence of a co-borrower on the probability of taking an ARM, contradictory to the expectation that a spouse or a co-borrower represents an additional income earner to spread the income risk in favour of an ARM. Brueckner and Follain (1988) find that higher income borrowers are more likely to take an ARM than lower income borrowers. Coulibaly and Li (2009) find that income volatility decreases the likelihood of taking an ARM while a college degree and mobility increases it. Paiella and Pozzolo (2007) find that only age, the presence of children and living expenditure can explain mortgage product choice from a set of fourteen variables representing borrower characteristics in Italy. Amromin et al (2011) find that income, college and youth are good determinants of mortgage choice. Cocco (2013) finds evidence for education, income growth and income risk for UK survey panel data.
with a one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate. Younger borrowers, who are at the beginning of their income life-cycle have a lower probability of choosing an ARM, despite potential (unmeasured) future income growth. Although the individual income risk variables have relatively small significant effects, combining them suggests that a higher income (2%) borrower, who has a professional occupation category (2.9%), is married (0.6%) and has a co-borrower (0.9%), and faces low unemployment risk (6.1%) will be 12.5 percent more likely to choose an ARM than the benchmark borrower, as theory predicts. In contrast, a young, single borrower with low income, no co-borrower, in an unskilled trade occupation, and in a high unemployment rate environment is over 14 percent more likely to take a CM product than the benchmark borrower.
17 Interestingly, status as either self-employed or a small business proprietor does not have a significant effect in the specification including all of the mortgage cost, market conditions and borrower characteristics -only when the estimation is performed using the restricted variable set of borrower characteristics alone are these effects significant, as shown in column (4) of the tables.
Although income risk may be low, borrowing constraints may be binding and restrict the contract choice. To capture borrowing constraints we consider real income level and age, living expenditure, mortgage payment-to-income ratio (PTIR) and presence of dependent children. 18 Our results show small, but statistically significant effects consistent with theory on borrowing constraints in the following ways. Younger applicants tend to choose a CM product, as do those with young children and those with higher living expenditure. While all individuals are sensitive to the interest rate differential between products, this is particularly evident for low income borrowers -the interaction term between RAT EDIF F and income level is significantly negative. As an exemplar of this category, we calculate that a borrower under 30 years old, with children under 5 years old, where their real 17 This result seems to contrast with the conclusion in Cocco (2013), who finds that higher income risks decrease the probability of alternative mortgage products (AMPs). However, in Cocco (2013) AMPs are compared to principal repayment mortgages, while in our paper both CMs and ARMs are both principal repayment mortgages with different interest rate fixation.
18 LaCava and Simon (2003) show that older borrowers, a large family size, renter status, unemployed status, females, disabled, low income level, low dwelling value, high income from government benefits and few credit cards result in a higher probability of cash-constraint.
gross monthly income is $1,000 lower than average, and monthly living expenses are $1,000 more than average, is 6.5 percent more likely to take a CM than an ARM. The most important of the influences they face in choosing their mortgage contract is seeking the lowest interest rate.
We use variables from both market conditions and borrower characteristics to capture wealth risk. High net wealth and liquid assets together with low short-term liabilities suggest that borrowers could repay the mortgage sooner and have lower default risk; these effects are statistically significant, but without economic impact.
The presence of a co-borrower gives a bigger pool of wealth to the household, and decreases wealth risk; again the effect is relatively small. However, potential capital gains through housing exercise a relatively large impact. Borrowers expecting equity growth on their property are significantly more likely to hold the interest rate risk of an ARM in order to access the expected equity gain. (In the Australian market, borrowers who wish to upgrade to a new property by taking advantage of equity gain, face prepayment penalties in CM products as well as transaction costs.) Improvements in the household perception of the state of the housing market measured by the change in the dwelling index increase the probability of taking an ARM by 21 percent.
In line with existing results on mobility risk, applicants who are purchasing a property in a different postcode to their current address, whom we identify as more mobile, are 2.3 percent more likely to take an ARM. This result reflects that CMs have higher associated pre-payment penalties in Australia than ARMs.
A number of other interesting results are apparent. The literature suggests that females, older individuals and those with dependent children tend to be more risk averse; and these effects are supported in our results. Our model predicts that a female borrower with 2 children under 5 years old is 4.5 percent more likely to take a CM than a male borrower with no dependents. Moreover, females and first home buyers are usually less financially experienced. A female first time buyer is 4.7 percent more likely to take a CM than a repeated male buyer. We identify borrowers with several credit accounts and credit facilities, and who have a long history with the bank (5 more years), as potentially more financially sophisticated, and find that these effects operate to increase the probability of choosing an ARM product by 5.4 percent.
The results presented here are a powerful validation of the theoretically expected signs of borrower characteristics on mortgage choice. For the first time a relatively complete set of borrower characteristics has been available to examine mortgage product choice. This database has high quality income and household characteristic data and has not had to rely on imputed or survey data to describe the household. Nor, in the Australian market, are there institutional arrangements which interfere with our observation of the risk allocation between household and financial institution in mortgage transactions. The direct consequence has been that we are able to show that as anticipated; income risk increases the probability that the household will choose a product which reduces its exposure to payment variability, at least in the first part of the contract; mobility risk leads households to choose more flexible ARM products. The CM products help households manage their income and wealth risk, but also allow households to enter the housing market when they believe that potential rising house prices and rising inflation will result in a real wealth transfer from creditors to debtors.
Loan-to-valuation ratio (LTV)
Although there are many papers discussing the impact of Basel capital requirements on mortgage providers 19 we are not aware of previous direct evidence on the outcomes of these requirements for individual mortgage applicants. During the sample period Australian mortgages attracted a concessional risk weight of 50 percent when LTV was less than 80 percent, or 60 percent for low-doc loans. Loans which did not meet these criteria only qualified for the capital requirement discount if they were fully insured -which in the Australian context requires the loan applicant to take a private insurance contract which pays directly to the bank in the event of default. While our database does not specifically distinguish low-doc loans, Figure 1 reveals the bimodal distribution of the LTV data for the contract applications, precisely around the 60 and 80 percent Basel capital cut-off points; a third mode occurs at 95 percent.
LTV ratios at origination are known to be associated with higher default risk for the lender; see Von Furstenberg (1969) , Vandell (1978) , and Qi and Yang We repeat our investigation of mortgage choice distinguishing three subsamples of LTVs: LTV≤ 60%, 60%<LTV≤ 80%, and LTV>80%. Tables 6-8 Married applicants, or those with co-borrowers, are more likely to take an ARM for a low LTV loan, but more likely to take a CM with a high LTV relative to their respective benchmarks. This result suggests that borrowers with low default risk (low LTV) may be more prepared to bear the interest rate risk of an ARM when they can combine their income with other income earners. Skilled-and unskilledtrade borrowers are more likely to prefer CMs when facing large LTVs. More mobile borrowers are likely to take an ARM if their LTV is very high, however the mobility motive is not a relevant factor in mortgage type choice for borrowers with low LTV who enjoy higher house equity. Borrowers with current high LTVs may be willing to bear the interest rate risk of ARMs, consistent with the strong, almost 20 percent increase in probability of taking an ARM for all groups in the face of perceived good buying conditions as indicated by the change in the Melbourne Institute Dwelling Index.
The examplar households from the previous section illustrate the effect of the LTV categories on the role of borrower characteristics in mortgage choice. In the full sample results, a higher income borrower, from a professional occupation 20 category, who is married with a co-borrower and faces low unemployment risk was 12.5 percent more likely to choose an ARM than the benchmark. However, once we adjust for LTV category -which means that the benchmark borrower is also in that LTV category -borrowers with low LTV are 15.8 percent more likely to choose an ARM than the benchmark borrower in their LTV category. In the over 80 percent LTV category, they are only 7.1 percent more likely to choose an ARM than the average borrower with a greater than 80 percent LTV. The second exemplar is a borrower under 30 years old, with children under 5 years old and gross monthly income $1,000 lower than average and living expenses $1,000 higher than average who was 6.5 percent less likely to choose an ARM than the sample benchmark applicant. When compared with the benchmark borrower in the low, less than 60 percent LTV category, these borrowers are almost 10 percent less likely to choose an ARM product, but this drops to only 3.5 percent less likely in the over 80 percent LTV category.
The results of this section show that we can identify, by their borrower characteristics, a group of applicants, who when faced with high LTV loans prefer CMs in order to lower their risk exposure. Other borrowers with high LTVs may be prepared to hold more risk; this group includes particularly young borrowers and first home buyers. The results highlight the potential importance of LTV, and its relationship with prudential capital rules. While the borrowers may be unaware of it, the prudential regulations around capital requirements on lenders, are demonstrably interacting with the borrower characteristics in influencing mortgage product choice.
Robustness
The results presented in this paper are robust against an extensive set of alternative specifications. We calculated the average interest rate on contracts using daily rather than monthly data, we used the market spreads between interest rates on these products rather than those reported by the bank. We have investigated the role of other non-reported explanatory variables such as: the Reserve Bank of Australia target interest rate, yield spread between long-and short-term bonds/bills, expected inflation, monthly real mortgage repayments, age as a continuous variable, experience represented by quadratic age, net real monthly income, time at current and previous address, time at current and previous employment.
State levels of unemployment, inflation and housing price inflation did not provide further information than the national levels. A hybrid log and level specification, using log transformations for real wealth variables, or a log specification for all real monetary values, were also qualitatively the same. Finally, we find that market condition variables are more informative than simply substituting for these with yearly or monthly dummies for fixed time effects.
Our preferred specification -column (2) in Tables 3-5 -predicts correctly 65.21
percent of the cases. The sensitivity (probability of predicting an ARM on borrowers who take an ARM) is 80.36 percent, while the specificity (probability of predicting a CM on borrowers who take a CM) is 43.85 percent. We checked the consistency of our preferred specification by estimating the probability of taking a CM rather than an ARM, used both Probit and Logit, and we obtain qualitatively similar results.
In summary, subject to this wide-range of robustness checks, the results of the paper are maintained. Borrower characteristics are significant explanators of mortgage choice. Importantly, the prudential regulatory capital requirements on LTV ratios resulting from Basel II are shown to have a significant influence on the role borrower characteristics play in influencing household mortgage choice.
Conclusion
Borrower characteristics should proxy for the risk profiles of mortgage applicants -in theory divining income, wealth and mobility risk from observable features. Existing empirical evidence for this, however, is mixed and inconclusive. In a unique proprietary dataset for an economy where banks fund the majority of mortgages and this debt is held on-balance-sheet, we now produce evidence completely aligned with theoretical predictions about the impact of borrower characteristics on mortgage product choice. Our Australian database consists of verified financial and demographic information on over half-a-million mortgage applications for ARM and CM products.
CM products lie between the ARM and the standard long-term FRM most often considered in the literature -but which do not exist in Australia. CMs offer delayed repayments and attract borrowers seeking lower short-run payment commitments. We find the effects anticipated in the theoretical literature, but rarely empirically confirmed; borrowers facing income risk and wealth risk are more likely to choose products which reduce their initial repayments, that is CMs. In contrast, those facing mobility risk are more likely to choose an ARM. While these borrower effects are significant, we confirm the findings elsewhere that mortgage costs are the dominant determinant of product choice. So, a typical young borrower, with dependents and high expenditure have increased probability of choosing a CM, whereas an older, higher income borrower with evidence of job mobility has increased probability of choosing an ARM.
Even more strikingly, we are able to exploit the effects of the LTV ratios defined by Basel capital adequacy requirements which particularly affect lenders who retain mortgage debt on-balance-sheet. Mortgages with LTV of below 80 percent (and 60 percent for low doc contracts) attract a 50 percent discount on Basel capital requirements, and the LTVs in our database are bi-modally distributed around these thresholds.
High LTV borrowers are even more likely to seek the lowest interest rate product than the benchmark applicant. However, the mobility motive for seeking an ARM remains dominant, even when the applicant faces a high LTV. Income risk also interacts with the extent of LTV -married, high income, professional applicants in a low unemployment environment with a co-borrower who have low LTV opt for ARM products, whilst the same applicant with high LTV prefers a CM.
In Australia, where long-term FRMs are non-existent and the securitization market is not facilitated by GSEs, banks cannot redistribute mortgage debt risk to other investors. Therefore, when making a loan decision, the bank will consider the distribution of both the interest rate risk and the credit risk between the borrower and the lender. Consider for example a potentially vulnerable group; first home borrowers with high living expenses and low income. Those with low LTV choose CM products, reducing their repayments in the short-term -and represent high interest rate risk but low credit risk for the bank. However, those with high LTV, where the bank faces higher credit risk, take ARM products and bear the interest rate risk themselves.
We conclude that the mortgage type chosen and the LTV agreed behave as 23 non-rate terms in mortgage contracts to discriminate and account for credit and prepayment risk variability across borrowers. We intend to extend this line of research in future work. 
